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With the recent passage of the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act
(“JOBS Act”) and proposed regulations, equity crowdfunding is poised to
play an important role in fundraising for many types of emerging growth
companies.  A fundamental purpose of crowdfunding is to reduce
economic barriers to capital markets for emerging growth companies, in
part by relaxing rigorous information disclosure requirements currently
mandated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”).1
Relaxed regulation should help reduce the cost of fundraising, but it will
also present certain risks.  Investor fraud is a common concern, which is
addressed at length in the JOBS Act and related regulation.2  Perhaps less
obvious, but nonetheless present, is the risk of money laundering, which is
the subject of this Note.
Money laundering in crowdfunding may manifest in several ways.  For
example, an issuer may collude with investors to exchange money for
securities in a nefarious enterprise under the fac¸ade of a business
transaction.  More specifically, a fake investor seeking to purchase bulk
narcotics (or other contraband) could crowdfund a sham company owned
by a narcotics distributor.  The investor/buyer would receive narcotics plus
* J.D. Candidate, May 2015, University of Michigan Law School. The author would
like to thank his family, friends, professors, and former coworkers for all of their support
along the way, and the MBELR staff for their tireless assistance.
1. Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306
(2012) [hereinafter “JOBS Act”] (providing that the Act is intended “[t]o increase American
job creation and economic growth by improving access to the public capital markets for
emerging growth companies.”).
2. See, e.g., JOBS Act § 301 (“This title may be cited as the ‘Capital Raising Online
While Deterring Fraud and Unethical Non–Disclosure Act of 2012’ or the ‘CROWDFUND
Act.’”) (emphasis added); Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66428, 66461–65 (proposed Nov. 5,
2013) [hereinafter “Regulation Crowdfunding”] (providing a section entitled “Measures to
Reduce Risk of Fraud”).
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(worthless) equity.  The issuer/narcotics distributor would receive funds
electronically under the guise of a legitimate crowdfunding offering, which
would be easier to integrate into the financial system than if the
transaction were conducted in cash.
A similar process could be used to funnel money out of the country to
fund terrorism.  If fifty fake investors crowdfund a sham company that
purports to do charitable work abroad, the investors could transfer funds
to the company by purchasing (worthless) equity, and the company could
transfer the money abroad under the guise of its business.  The existence
of a public crowdfunding solicitation would actually bolster the apparent
legitimacy of the international funds transfer.  Of course, these risks apply
to any securities offering, which is precisely why the SEC’s proposed
regulations require crowdfunding portals to comply with anti-money
laundering regulations analogous to a traditional broker-dealer.3
This Note explores money laundering risks presented by equity
crowdfunding and recommends an approach for funding portals to
manage these risks.  Part I discusses the topic of crowdfunding, focusing
primarily on proposed regulations for crowdfunding portals, issuers, and
investors.  Part II provides an overview of the significant role that financial
institutions in the United States play in the monitoring, reporting, and
prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing.  Part III
recommends implementing a risk-based approach to combat money
laundering, which should enable funding portals to fulfill regulatory
obligations while containing costs.
PART I: OVERVIEW OF JOBS ACT
The JOBS Act was passed on April 5, 2012 with a stated goal of “im-
proving access to the public capital markets for emerging growth compa-
nies.”4  Toward this goal, Title I of the JOBS Act relaxes the regulatory
disclosure requirements for emerging growth companies, thereby reducing
significant legal and accounting costs.5  Title II lifts the historic ban on
public solicitation, reducing the costs associated with private placement
and increasing the potential pool of investors.6  Title III provides a new
exemption to the Securities Act of 19337 for equity crowdfunding, which is
a process for emerging growth companies to raise relatively small amounts
of money from a large crowd of investors—both accredited and unac-
3. Regulation Crowdfunding, supra note 2, at 66491 (“[A] funding portal would be
required to comply with all of the provisions in the [Bank Secrecy Act] and its implementing
regulations that are applicable to broker-dealers.”).
4. JOBS Act pmbl. (discussing purpose of JOBS Act).
5. Id. §§ 101–108.
6. Id. § 201 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(1)).
7. Id. § 302 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77d).
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credited.8  Crowdfunding offerings are limited to a maximum of $1,000,000
per issuer, per twelve-month period.9
There are three main participants in a crowdfunding transaction, each
of which has reduced obligations as compared to a traditional securities
offering.  The first major participant is the emerging growth company
seeking to raise funds, referred to as the issuer.10  The second major par-
ticipant is the investor, who contributes capital to the emerging growth
company in exchange for an equity stake.11  The third major participant is
an intermediary12—either a funding portal13 or a traditional broker-
dealer14—that facilitates the connection between issuers and investors.
A. Requirements for Investors
Investors in a crowdfunding transaction may be accredited15 or unac-
credited.16  Regardless of accreditation status, there are statutory limits on
the amount of money that an investor may invest through crowdfunding
during a twelve-month period.17  If an investor has an annual income or
net worth less than $100,000, then during a twelve-month period, the in-
vestor may only purchase securities worth up to $2,000 or 5% of the inves-
tor’s annual income or net worth, whichever is greater.18  If an investor
has an annual income or net worth of $100,000 or more, then during a
twelve-month period, the investor may only purchase securities worth
10% of the investor’s annual income or net worth, up to a maximum in-
8. Regulation Crowdfunding, supra note 2, at 66429 n.12; Heather L. Traeger, Theo-
dore W. Kassinger & Zachary D. Kaufman, Democratizing Entrepreneurship: An Overview
of the Past, Present, and Future of Crowdfunding, 45 Bloomberg BNA Sec. Regulation &
Law Report 208, 208–17 (2013).
9. JOBS Act § 302 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §77d(a)(6)(A)).
10. Id. (codified at 15 U.S.C.A § 77d-1(b)).
11. Traeger et al., supra note 8, at 45.
12. JOBS Act § 302 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A § 77d-1(a)).
13. Id. § 304 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(80)) (defining “funding portal”).
14. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4) (defining “broker”); 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(5) (defining
“dealer”); JOBS Act § 304 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78c(h)(1)); see also 31 C.F.R.
§ 1023.320(a)(1) (2013) (introducing the term “broker-dealer”).
15. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2013) (defining “accredited”).
16. Regulation Crowdfunding, supra note 2, at 66429 n.12 (“[C]rowdfunding is pre-
mised on permitting sales of securities to any interested person, not just to investors who
meet specific qualifications, such as accredited investors.”).
17. Id. at 66434 (declining to provide different investment limits for accredited and
unaccredited investors).
18. JOBS Act § 302 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6)(B)(i)) (providing that the
threshold is “the greater of $2,000 or 5 percent”); see also Regulation Crowdfunding, supra
note 2, at 66433 (clarifying that the threshold is based on the greater of net worth or annual
income).
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vestment of $100,000.19  This limit is cumulative across all crowdfunding
investments made by the investor.20
Interestingly, the burden of ensuring that aggregate investment limits
are not violated falls primarily on the intermediary, rather than the inves-
tor or the issuer.21  However, this should not be overly burdensome.
Under the proposed regulations, an intermediary may rely on an investor’s
representations about other crowdfunding investments to enforce the ag-
gregate twelve-month cap, unless the intermediary has reason to question
the reliability of the representations.22
B. Requirements for Issuers
An issuer must disclose basic material information on the company,
including: its location, ownership, and capital structure; the identities of its
officers, directors, and 20% or more shareholders;23 and information re-
garding the business experience of directors and officers of the issuer for
the preceding three years.24  The issuer must also provide a target offering
amount, a description of its business plan, and an explanation of the in-
tended use of the funds raised.25  Importantly, the issuer must disclose va-
rying degrees of financial information depending on its target offering
amount.  If the target offering is over $500,000, then the issuer must dis-
close audited financials.26  If the target offering is $500,000 or less, but
over $100,000, then the issuer must disclose financial statements reviewed
by an independent accountant (but not necessarily formally audited).27  If
the target offering is $100,000 or less, then the issuer need only provide
financial statements certified to be true and complete by the issuer’s prin-
19. JOBS Act § 302 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6)(B)(ii)); see also Regulation
Crowdfunding, supra note 2, at 66433 (clarifying that the threshold is based on the greater of
net worth or annual income).
20. Regulation Crowdfunding, supra note 2, at 66469 (providing that “[s]ection
4(a)(6)(B) imposes certain limitations on the aggregate amount of securities that can be sold
to an investor in reliance on Section 4(a)(6) during a 12-month period.”) (emphasis added);
158 CONG. REC. S5476 (daily ed. July 26, 2012) (statement of Sen. Merkley) (explaining that
aggregate investor caps are intended to apply cumulatively across all crowdfunding invest-
ments because the inherent riskiness of funding emerging growth companies is “not amena-
ble to ordinary means of mitigation through diversification”); see JOBS Act § 302 (codified
at 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(a)(8)) (clarifying that investor limits apply “in the aggregate, from all
issuers,” and providing that this responsibility only pertains to securities offered pursuant to
Section 4(a)(6), which is the section on Crowdfunding); see also id. (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 77d(a)(6)(B)(i)–(ii) (outlining the investment limits).
21. See JOBS Act § 302 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(a)(8)).
22. Regulation Crowdfunding, supra note 2, at 66470 (providing that “an intermediary
may rely on an investor’s representations concerning compliance with investment limitation
requirements.”).
23. See JOBS Act § 302 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77d-1(b)(1)(A), (B), (H)).
24. Regulation Crowdfunding, supra note 2, at 66439.
25. JOBS Act § 302 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77d-1(b)(1)(C), (E), (F)).
26. Id. (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77d-1(b)(1)(D)(iii)).
27. See id (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77d-1(b)(1)(D)(ii)).
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cipal executive officer, plus income tax returns for the prior year (if any).28
Despite these relaxed disclosure requirements, issuers remain liable for
any material misrepresentations or omissions.29
One final consideration is that the issuer must be a domestic com-
pany.30  However, this should not prevent an issuer from organizing a do-
mestic holding company to issue securities and receive funds and then
immediately forwarding those funds to an international affiliate.31  This
will be the likely structure adopted by legitimate international emerging
growth companies, especially those seeking to raise money in the United
States to carry out double bottom-line missions abroad.32  At first glance,
this requirement may seem an unnecessary formality if the funds will be
immediately sent on to an international affiliate.  However, it does serve
some anti-money laundering and anti-fraud purposes by requiring some-
one in the United States to be the registered agent of the company and
establishing jurisdiction for a lawsuit.  It may also ensure that the funds
received as a result of the crowdfunding offering are initially deposited
into a domestic bank account subject to domestic regulatory requirements,
which would help create a more accessible paper trail for United States
law enforcement.33
C. Requirements for Intermediaries
All crowdfunding transactions must be conducted through a registered
intermediary—either a funding portal or a broker-dealer.34  Collectively,
these intermediaries will serve as an online marketplace for issuers to pub-
licize crowdfunding offerings and for investors to conveniently browse in-
vestment opportunities.35  The SEC estimates that in a mature
crowdfunding market, there will be approximately 50 funding portals and
28. Id. (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77d-1(b)(1)(D)(i)).
29. Id. (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(c)).
30. Id. (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(f)(1)).
31. See Regulation Crowdfunding, supra note 2, at 66436–37 (providing criteria for
issuers that would not qualify for the crowdfunding exemption; none of the exclusionary
criteria appear to disqualify a domestic holding company established for the purpose of trans-
ferring funds to a specified affiliate abroad).
32. Chance Barnett, Will Crowdfunding Ignite Investing For Profits and Purpose?,
FORBES (August 9, 2012, 11:10 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/chancebarnett/2012/08/09/
will-crowdfunding-ignite-investing-for-profits-purpose. See Lori Kozlowski, Impact Investing:
The Power of Two Bottom Lines, FORBES (Oct. 2, 2012, 2:08 PM), http://www.forbes.com/
sites/lorikozlowski/2012/10/02/impact-investing-the-power-of-two-bottom-lines, for a discus-
sion of double bottom line companies seeking to achieve both financial returns and social
returns.
33. The JOBS Act and proposed regulations are silent as to whether funds must be
deposited into a domestic bank account. For both money laundering and fraud concerns, this
should be required and should be clarified in the SEC’s final rules on crowdfunding.
34. JOBS Act § 302 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6)(C)).
35. Regulation Crowdfunding, supra note 2, at 66529 (“The proposed rules would also
require that an intermediary execute transactions exclusively through its online platform.”).
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approximately 60 broker-dealers.36  The two entity types will engage in
similar activity in terms of serving as a marketplace for crowdfunding of-
ferings; however, broker-dealers will be permitted to continue to engage in
broader securities activities, while funding portals’ activities will be limited
to the crowdfunding realm.37  Consistent with the difference in permitted
activities, funding portals will be exempt from traditional broker-dealer
registration and will instead be subject to more narrowly tailored registra-
tion and regulation requirements.38  Such narrow tailoring should enable
funding portals to facilitate crowdfunding transactions without imposing
an undue burden given the funding portals’ limited activities.39
Specifically, funding portals may not “offer investment advice or rec-
ommendations,”40 nor may funding portals “hold, manage, possess, or oth-
erwise handle investor funds or securities.”41  Because of this latter
prohibition, a funding portal must partner with a bank or other qualified
third party in order to effectuate the actual exchange of funds for securi-
ties.42  Figure 1, below, illustrates the general structure of a crowdfunding
transaction.  Primary contact between the issuer and investors is facilitated
by the funding portal; however, the back-office exchange of funds for
stock must be conducted by a bank or other qualified third party.43
36. See id. at 66527.
37. See id. at 66528, 66533, 66429 (“A person that operates [a funding portal] for the
purchase of securities of startups and small businesses . . . may find it impractical in view of
the limited nature of that person’s activities and business to register as a broker-dealer and
operate under the full set of regulatory obligations that apply to broker-dealers.”).
38. JOBS Act § 304 (codified at 15 U.S.C.§78c(h)); see also Regulation Crowdfunding,
supra note 2, at 66555–56 (requiring a funding portal to be a member of a national securities
association registered with the SEC); id. at 66459 (providing that the Financial Industry Reg-
ulatory Authority (FINRA) is the only national securities association that currently meets the
aforementioned requirement).
39. Regulation Crowdfunding, supra note 2, at 66528, 66533, 66429; 158 Cong. Rec.
S5476 (daily ed. July 26, 2012) (statement of Sen. Merkley) (“The CROWDFUND Act is
designed so that funding portals will be subject to fewer regulatory requirements than bro-
ker-dealers because they will do fewer things than broker-dealers.”).
40. JOBS Act § 304 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77c(80)(A)). But see Regulation
Crowdfunding, supra note 2, at 66463–64 (discussing Proposed Regulation § 227.301(c),
which requires an intermediary to deny access to issuers if fraud or other investor protection
concerns are presented; this requirement arguably constitutes investment advice as an im-
plicit recommendation that issuers listed on the funding portal present an acceptable level of
fraud risk).
41. JOBS Act § 304 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77c(80)(D)).
42. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(6) (defining “bank”); Regulation Crowdfunding, supra note 2,
at 66557–58 (discussing Proposed Regulation § 227.303(e)(2)); see also id. at 66532 (“In-
termediaries registered as funding portals would be required to direct investors to transmit
the funds or other consideration directly to a qualified third party.”).
43. Regulation Crowdfunding, supra note 2, at 66557–58 (discussing Proposed Regula-
tion § 227.303(e)); see also id. at 66532.
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FIGURE 1
Funding portals also have affirmative duties to educate and protect in-
vestors by ensuring that each investor reads and understands the risks as-
sociated with equity investing in emerging growth companies.44  The
JOBS Act requires that funding portals take measures to reduce the risk
of fraud, including obtaining a “background and securities enforcement
regulatory history check” on the issuer, its directors, officers, and 20% or
more shareholders, as well as any other measures a funding portal deems
appropriate.45  Finally, the SEC’s proposed regulations provide that fund-
ing portals must comply with Bank Secrecy Act anti-money laundering
requirements analogous to a broker-dealer—namely, the regulations
promulgated under 15 C.F.R. Chapter X, Part 1023.46  Parts II and III
explore these obligations in greater detail.
PART II: ROLE OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN COMBATING MONEY
LAUNDERING IN THE UNITED STATES
Financial institutions47 in the United States play an important role in
combating money laundering,48 terrorist financing, and other crimes asso-
ciated with illicit wealth generation and transmission, a compliance pro-
cess known as Anti-Money Laundering (“AML”).49  Under the Bank
44. JOBS Act § 302 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(a)(4)).
45. Id. (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(a)(5)); Regulation Crowdfunding, supra note 2,
at 66463–64.
46. Regulation Crowdfunding, supra note 2, at 66490–95 (discussing, in part, Proposed
Regulation § 227.403(b)).
47. See 31 U.S.C. § 5312(a)(2) (2012) (defining “financial institution”).
48. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1159 (10th ed. 2009) (defining money laundering as
“[t]he act of transferring illegally obtained money through legitimate people or accounts so
that its original source cannot be traced.”).
49. See generally Bank Secrecy Act Anti-Money Laundering Examination Manual: Sus-
picious Activity Reporting, FED. FIN. INSTS. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, https://www.ffiec.gov/
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Secrecy Act,50 every financial institution is required to implement an
AML program to monitor, investigate, and report “suspicious activity”51
to the Treasury Department—specifically, the Financial Crimes Enforce-
ment Network (“FinCEN”).52  FinCEN maintains a database of every Sus-
picious Activity Report (“SAR”) filed by financial institutions, which can
be accessed by certain law enforcement agencies to aid in investigations.53
For example, if the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) is investi-
gating John Smith for suspected human trafficking, an FBI agent can re-
quest a FinCEN SAR database search for “John Smith,” or for John
Smith’s known addresses, telephone numbers, Social Security numbers,
and other information.54  If John Smith has been frequently depositing
$9,999 in cash into a single bank account in an apparent attempt to avoid
the $10,000 currency transaction reporting threshold,55 that bank would
probably have filed a SAR, which would contain John Smith’s name, dem-
ographic information, and a description of John’s Smith suspicious activity.
The agent could then request additional information from the financial
institution that may be helpful in her investigation, including: other
sources of funds to John Smith’s account; the destination of any large pay-
ments out of the account; and other accounts maintained by John Smith.56
The SAR process enables the agent to leverage the financial institution’s
expertise in identifying suspicious activity and navigating its own internal
systems, and to quickly focus her investigation on known suspicious
activity.57
bsa_aml_infobase/pages_manual/OLM_015.htm (last visited Sept. 25, 2014) (discussing the
important role of financial institutions in AML).
50. The term “Bank Secrecy Act” refers to a legislative framework that requires
United States financial institutions to assist law enforcement agencies in the detection and
prevention of money laundering. It encompasses inter alia the Currency and Foreign Transac-
tions Reporting Act of 1970, the PATRIOT Act, and regulations promulgated under 31
C.F.R. Chapter X. See FinCEN’s Mandate from Congress, FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NET-
WORK, http://www.fincen.gov/statutes_regs/bsa/ (last visited Nov. 30, 2014) (“The Currency
and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act of 1970 (which legislative framework is commonly
referred to as the ‘“Bank Secrecy Act’” or ‘“BSA’”) requires U.S. financial institutions to
assist U.S. government agencies to detect and prevent money laundering.”).
51. “Suspicious activity” is a term of art in AML and refers to unusual transactions
that a financial institution concludes are indicative of money laundering, terrorist financing,
fraud, or other criminal activity. See 31 C.F.R. § 1023.320(a)(2), discussed infra at III(a).
52. 31 U.S.C. § 310 (2012).
53. 31 U.S.C. § 310(b)(2); 31 C.F.R. § 1010.520(b) (2014).
54. 31 C.F.R. § 1010.520(b)(1). See generally 31 U.S.C. § 310(b)(2)(B).
55. 31 C.F.R. § 1010.100(xx). Avoiding the $10,000 threshold is not the only circum-
stance under which a SAR should be filed, it is simply a well-known example of suspicious
activity. See, e.g., Fin. Crimes Enforcement Network, Guidance on Preparing a Complete &
Sufficient Suspicious Activity Report Narrative, 5–6 (November 2003), available at http://www
.fincen.gov/statutes_regs/files/sarnarrcompletguidfinal_112003.pdf (providing examples of
suspicious activity typologies, including apparent evasion of reporting requirements).
56. See 31 U.S.C. 310(b)(2)(B); 31 C.F.R. § 1010.520(b).
57. Fin. Crimes Enforcement Network, Guidance on Preparing a Complete & Suffi-
cient Suspicious Activity Report Narrative, 3 (November 2003), available at http://www.fincen
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Among other purposes, this comprehensive system of suspicious activ-
ity reporting serves as a barrier to illicit funds generated abroad being
transferred into the United States, and as a barrier to legitimate funds
within the United States being transferred abroad to fund criminal and/or
terrorist activities.  It is important that all significant participants in the
financial system be subject to similar AML obligations so as to avoid any
chink in the armor that would allow foreign funds to gain an easy foothold
in the United States banking system, or conversely, to allow an easy depar-
ture point for domestic funds to be transferred abroad.58  This is especially
important given the risk-based approach discussed in Part III, below.
PART III: AML REQUIREMENTS FOR FUNDING PORTALS
A. Specific Requirements
There are three main requirements to a funding portal’s AML pro-
gram.  First, a funding portal must implement an effective Customer Iden-
tification Program (“CI Program”), which itself has three components: a)
collecting identifying information about the investor, issuer, and the is-
suer’s directors, officers and 20% or more shareholders; b) taking reasona-
ble steps to ensure this data is genuine (not a false identity); and c)
conducting a background check on the issuer and its significant personnel
to determine potential fraud or terrorism risks.59
Second, a funding portal must maintain a program to monitor and re-
port suspected money laundering activity to FinCEN (“SAR Program”).60
Specifically, a transaction (or series of transactions) requires reporting if it
is conducted or attempted through the funding portal, it involves at least
$5,000, and the funding portal “knows, suspects, or has reason to suspect”
that the transaction (or series of transactions): involves funds derived from
illegal activity; is designed to evade a mandatory reporting requirement;
has no apparent business or lawful purpose based on available informa-
tion; and/or is in furtherance of criminal activity or terrorism.61  In other
words, if a transaction (or a series of transactions) involves at least $5,000
and looks suspicious or has no apparent legitimate purpose, then it should
be reported to FinCEN.62
.gov/statutes_regs/files/sarnarrcompletguidfinal_112003.pdf (explaining, generally, the pur-
pose of SARs in law enforcement investigations).
58. The regulations promulgated under Chapter X address a wide range of financial
industries, from banking and insurance, to casinos, to dealers of precious metals, stones, or
jewels. See generally 31 C.F.R. Subt. B Ch. X (2013).
59. 31 C.F.R. § 1023.220(a)(2); Regulation Crowdfunding, supra note 2, at 66556. No-
tably, the proposed regulations only explicitly require a background check for fraud and ter-
rorism; however, a more general criminal background check (to include, for example,
trafficking of narcotics, weapons, or people) would be advisable from an AML standpoint.
60. Regulation Crowdfunding, supra note 2, at 66492.
61. 31 C.F.R. § 1023.320(a)(2); Regulation Crowdfunding, supra note 2, at 66492.
62. Id.
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Third, a funding portal must maintain a system for complying with re-
quests for information from FinCEN and other law enforcement agencies
(a “314(a) Requirement”).63  Such requests will typically ask whether the
funding portal maintains any relationships with a given individual or en-
tity, and if so, to provide certain information about the individual or en-
tity’s account activity.64  FinCEN requests may also be follow-up inquiries
on a prior SAR filing in order to obtain additional information.65  A fund-
ing portal can comply with the 314(a) Requirement by designating a point
person, providing that person’s contact information to FinCEN, and ensur-
ing that information requests are completed in a timely manner.66
B. Introduction to a “Risk-Based Approach”
Implementing CI and SAR Programs that comply with regulatory re-
quirements while containing costs is a universal challenge faced by finan-
cial institutions.  A leading approach to tackling this challenge is to utilize
a risk-based approach, which allocates AML resources based on the level
of risk associated with a given customer, transaction profile, or line of bus-
iness.67  By dedicating increased AML resources to an otherwise higher
risk activity, the financial institution can essentially reduce the risk of the
given activity down to acceptable levels.  The goal is not to prohibit higher
risk activities entirely, but rather to ensure that appropriate risk mitigation
strategies are implemented when necessary.68  Guidance from the Finan-
cial Action Task Force (“FATF”) states that “[c]ompetent authorities ex-
pect financial institutions to put in place effective policies, program[ ]s,
procedures and systems to mitigate the risk and acknowledge that even
with effective systems not every suspect transaction will necessarily be de-
tected.”69  That said, it is important to note that while the risk-based ap-
proach encourages efficient allocation of understandably scarce resources,
63. Regulation Crowdfunding, supra note 2, at 66491–92 (discussing the “314(a) Re-
quirement,” so named due to section 314(a) of the PATRIOT Act (Uniting and Strengthen-
ing America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism
(USA Patriot Act) Act of 2001 PL 107–56, 115 Stat 272 (2001))).
64. Id.
65. See Suspicious Activity Report Supporting Documentation (FIN-2007-G003), FIN.
CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK (June 13, 2007), http://www.fincen.gov/statutes_regs/gui
dance/html/Supporting_Documentation_Guidance.html.
66. 31 C.F.R. § 1023.520 (referring to § 1010.520, especially §§ 1010.520(b) (discussing
information production responsibilities in general) and 1010.520(b)(3)(iii) (discussing contact
person)); Regulation Crowdfunding, supra note 2, at 66491–92.
67. See FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, GUIDANCE ON THE RISK-BASED APPROACH TO
COMBATING MONEY LAUNDERING AND TERRORIST FINANCING: HIGH LEVEL PRINCIPLES
AND PROCEDURES (2007), [hereinafter FATF RISK-BASED GUIDANCE]. Note that FATF is
an inter-governmental body that promulgates recommendations on effective AML controls.
FATF reports are cited in Regulation Crowdfunding in support of the proposed AML
requirements.
68. Id. at 2.39.
69. Id. at 2.33.
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an overall failure to dedicate sufficient resources to an AML program can-
not justify systemic failures in AML monitoring.70
There are two reinforcing motivations for compliance with these AML
requirements: the civic duty to deter criminal activity (a carrot) and the
desire to avoid costly civil or criminal sanctions for failure to monitor and
report (a stick).71  It is important to keep the carrot in mind; however, it is
the stick that is probably most influential from a business perspective.
Under FINRA guidelines, a funding portal must develop and implement
an AML program reasonably designed to achieve compliance with the
Bank Secrecy Act.72  The Bank Secrecy Act requires that a funding portal
report transactions that it “knows, suspects, or has reason to suspect” are
related to money laundering.73  In effect, the SAR Program must be rea-
sonably designed to comply with a should-have-known standard.74
C. Implementing a Risk-Based Approach for Funding Portals
A risk-based approach sets forth at least two sets of procedures: stan-
dard and enhanced.75  The standard procedures serve two purposes.  First,
standard procedures should be designed to detect and prevent blatant
money laundering.  This ensures that obvious violations are not over-
looked.  Second, standard procedures serve as a screening method to iden-
tify higher risk customers and transactions that require enhanced
diligence.76  To this end, funding portals should conduct a risk assessment
70. STAFF OF PERM. S. SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 112TH CONG., REP. ON U.S.
VULNERABILITIES TO MONEY LAUNDERING, DRUGS, AND TERRORIST FINANCING: HSBC
CASE HISTORY 10 (2012) (discussing the role of severe AML deficiencies in levying a $1.9
billion fine, including an unacceptable backlog, insufficient staffing, and inappropriate risk
assessments).
71. See 31 C.F.R. §§ 1010.820, 1010.840 (2012) (discussing civil and criminal penalties).
72. FINRA Manual, FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., Rule 3310 (2014), available at
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display.html?rbid=2403&element_id=607 (last visited
Dec. 14, 2013) (emphasis added).
73. 31 C.F.R. § 1023.320(a)(2) (2014).
74. Anti-Money Laundering Source Tool for Broker-Dealers, U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
COMM’N, (June 20, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ocie/amlsourcetool.htm#3 (requir-
ing “policies and procedures that can be reasonably expected to detect and cause the report-
ing of transactions under 31 U.S.C. 5318(g) and the implementing regulations thereunder.”);
FATF Risk-Based Guidance, supra note 67, at 1.13 (“[R]egulators, law enforcement and judi-
cial authorities must take into account and give due consideration to a financial institution’s
well-reasoned risk-based approach.”). Note that although some civil penalties apply for negli-
gent violations, most civil penalties and all criminal penalties only apply to willful violations.
See 31 C.F.R. § 1010.820(h) (discussing negligent violations); § 1010.820 (a)–(g), § 1010.840
(discussing willful violations); see also Bank Secrecy Act Anti-Money Laundering Examina-
tion Manual, FED. FIN. INSTS. EXAMINATION COUNCIL App’x R, https://www.ffiec.gov/
bsa_aml_infobase/pages_manual/OLM_018.htm (last visited Sept. 25, 2014) (providing that
enforcement action will be taken if a financial institution fails to “establish and maintain a
reasonably designed BSA Program”).
75. See FATF RISK-BASED GUIDANCE, supra note 67, at 1.11.
76. See id.
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by determining which aspects of their crowdfunding business are most vul-
nerable to money laundering.77  From there, the funding portal should dis-
till these vulnerabilities into specific characteristics that can be used in an
automated transaction monitoring system to flag unusual transactions.78
Figure 2, below, illustrates some suggested characteristics that should be
considered.79  Any questions answered in the affirmative should lead to
enhanced diligence of the customer and/or transaction.
FIGURE 2
The first question asks whether the mandatory background check re-
quired of the issuer, its directors, officers, and 20% or more shareholders
produced any negative news or derogatory information.  The second ques-
tion asks whether the funding portal is unable to verify the identifying
information provided by its investors and issuers.80  Identification of de-
rogatory information or an inability to verify identity should lead to en-
hanced procedures.  These two questions generally fall under the heading
of the funding portal’s CI Program; however, the CI Program and SAR
Program do not operate in isolation.
The third question asks whether the offering will ultimately fund an
emerging growth company abroad, even if the issuer will technically be
domestic.  If so, and the intended destination is a high-risk (or perhaps
even medium-risk) jurisdiction for money laundering,81 then enhanced
77. See id. at 1.12.
78. FED. FIN. INSTS. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, supra note 74.
79. See generally id. at Appendix F: Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing “Red
Flags”; Special NASD Notice to Members 02-21, NAT’L ASS’N SEC. DEALERS 10-11 (April
2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ocie/aml2007/nasd-ntm-02-21.pdf (provid-
ing a list of red flags for broker-dealers).
80. See 31 C.F.R. § 1023.220(a)(2)(ii) (2011) (discussing “documentary” methods for
verifying customer identification, such as government-issued documents, and “non-documen-
tary” methods, such as credit reporting agencies).
81. Advisory on the FATF-Identified Jurisdictions with AML/CFT Deficiencies, FIN-
2013-A008 (2013) FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, http://www.fincen.gov/statutes_
regs/guidance/html/FIN-2013-A008.html; FATF Public Statement, High Risk and Non-Coop-
erative Jurisdictions (October 18, 2013), available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/topics/high-risk
andnon-cooperativejurisdictions/documents/fatf-public-statement-oct-2013.html; see, e.g., BU-
REAU OF INT’L NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS, International Narcotics Con-
trol Strategy Report (2013), available at http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2013/vol2/204062
.html.
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procedures should be undertaken.  Although the issuer could lie about the
intended destination, the need to disclose the company’s business plan and
intended use of funds should provide some assurance of truthful answers.
If all the information provided by the issuer is false, then the bank or qual-
ifying third party that actually conducts the transaction should be able to
easily identify the inconsistency when the actual funds transfer occurs.82
The fourth question asks whether the issuer’s target offering is
$100,000 or less and the issuer is unable to provide tax returns for the prior
year.  Such offerings present a heightened risk because the financial state-
ments of the company have not undergone external review; they are sim-
ply “certified” by an executive of the issuer, and there are no tax returns
to corroborate this information.83  The fifth question asks whether 75% or
more of the money raised in the offering is provided by investors that have
a connection to the issuer.84  Specifically, text-matching software could
compare the names, addresses, telephone numbers, and email addresses of
the respective customers to determine connections.  This protects against
the crowdfunding transaction being used as a fac¸ade for cycling money to
make it appear legitimate.  If an issuer can raise 75% or more of the
needed capital from parties that it already knows, why bother with the
expense of crowdfunding?85  A final consideration is that if FinCEN or
another law enforcement agency requests information on a particular cus-
tomer or transaction, the funding portal should take note and conduct en-
hanced review of that customer and/or activity.
Funding portals should periodically review these risk factors and cali-
brate them for effectiveness.  For example, the 75% funding-by-related-
persons threshold described in the fifth question above is intended as an
educated starting point for transaction monitoring.  Funding portals
should consider testing thresholds above and below 75%.  More specifi-
cally, assume that a 75% threshold results in eight SARs being filed for
every ten red-flagged transactions.  To test the 75% threshold, the finan-
cial institution can test a 50% matching threshold.  If the 50% matching
threshold results in significantly more red-flagged transactions, but a sub-
stantial decrease in the rate of SAR filings, that suggests that 75% is an
appropriate threshold.  In other words, casting a wider net (by decreasing
the threshold to red-flag more transactions) did not yield a correspond-
ingly larger catch.  Alternatively, if the decrease to 50% resulted in an
increase in the SAR-filing rate, the funding portal should consider perma-
82. Regulation Crowdfunding, supra note 2, at 66491 (providing that banks and other
financial institutions involved in the crowdfunding process have their own AML require-
ments, independent of the obligations on funding portals).
83. JOBS Act § 302 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(b)(1)(D)(i)).
84. See, e.g., FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, MONEY LAUNDERING AND FINANCING IN THE
SECURITIES SECTOR 33 (Oct. 2009) (Case study 10: Activity of Wash Trading).
85. This concern may be mitigated upon enhanced review if the investors are unac-
credited and crowdfunding is the only exemption available under the circumstances.
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nently decreasing the threshold to 50% (or lower) because casting a wider
net resulted in a material increase in the catch.
These quantitative results are, however, not absolute; funding portals
should also consider qualitative components.  The law requires that a SAR
be filed if inter alia a transaction “has no business or apparent lawful pur-
pose.”86  Investors may be idiosyncratic, superstitious, or otherwise not
entirely rational in their behavior.87  Even for entirely legitimate transac-
tions, it is not always possible to sufficiently articulate a business or appar-
ent lawful purpose, so casting a wider net will almost certainly raise the
number of SARs filed.  Funding portals should therefore analyze the qual-
ity of the SARs filed under the broadened threshold to determine whether
the increased SAR filings are primarily due to specific criminal concerns,
or simply an inability to explain customer behavior.  If the former, it sug-
gests that the lowered threshold (50%) is effective and should remain.  If
the latter, it suggests that the lowered threshold may not be effective and a
higher threshold could be tested.  This is not to say that inexplicable trans-
actions are not suspicious and should not be reported, but when evaluating
the effectiveness of a threshold, there is room for reasonable subjective
analysis.
D. Enhanced Procedures
When enhanced procedures are triggered, the precise scope and depth
of additional investigation required will depend on which heightened risk
factor(s) triggered the application of enhanced procedures.  The following
steps provide a rough outline of procedures that would be appropriate at
the enhanced stage, but are probably not necessary under standard cir-
cumstances.  First, a background check on the investors (not just the is-
suer) would be appropriate to screen for criminal or terrorist
involvement.88  Second, an in-depth review of the offering materials
should be undertaken, including a review of external sources to corrobo-
rate claims made in the offerings.  For example, the funding portal should
review the issuer’s website, check for independent news articles, identify
the presence or absence of independent third-party endorsements or ac-
creditations of the issuer’s activities (or intended activities), and survey
Google Maps satellite images of locations in which the issuer claims to
operate.
Third, the issuer’s financial statements should be reviewed in depth for
irregularities and opportunities for verification via independent sources.
86. 31 C.F.R. § 1023.320(a)(2).
87. Michael S. Barr et al., The Case for Behaviorally Informed Regulation, in NEW
PERSPECTIVES ON REGULATION 25, 25–26 (David Moss & John Cisternino eds., 2009) (dis-
cussing the empirically documented tendencies of financial consumers to depart from objec-
tively rational behavior).
88. World-Check is an industry-standard resource for this type of background check.
See generally Accelus World-Check, THOMPSON REUTERS, http://accelus.thomsonreuters
.com/products/world-check (last visited Nov. 30, 2014).
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Fourth, a review of the issuer’s offering history should be conducted, in-
cluding a review of offerings conducted through other funding portals, in
order to identify suspicious patterns.  While much of this information
should be publicly available, section 314(b) of the PATRIOT Act allows
financial institutions to share customer information with other financial
institutions for anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism purposes.89
E. Obligation to Report Suspicious Activity and
(Potentially) Deny Access to Platform
If a funding portal has identified money laundering concerns, it has an
obligation to file a SAR with FinCEN.90  The funding portal may also have
an obligation to deny or revoke access to its platform; however, this is
unclear from the proposed SEC regulations and general FinCEN gui-
dance.  The proposed regulations only require that a funding portal deny
access to its platform if it believes that the issuer “presents the potential
for fraud or otherwise raises concerns regarding investor protection.”91
Money laundering arguably does not usually raise investor protection con-
cerns because the investor is often either paid back in full without knowl-
edge of the illicit source of money, or is in collusion with the issuer.
More generally, there is little guidance available as to when a financial
institution of any sort is required to terminate a customer’s account based
on money laundering concerns.92  FinCEN acknowledges that this is an
area of significant uncertainty, yet makes no real attempt to offer any con-
crete guidance: “A filing of a SAR, on its own, should not be the basis for
terminating a customer relationship.”93  Rather, FinCEN opaquely in-
structs that “a determination should be made with the knowledge of the
facts and circumstances giving rise to the SAR filing, as well as other avail-
able information that could tend to impact on such a decision.”94  Even
when a financial institution has an obligation to directly notify appropriate
law enforcement authorities because the activity identified “requires im-
mediate attention,” there is no explicit requirement for account termina-
tion or denial of access.95
89. PATRIOT Act, 31 C.F.R. § 1010.540(b) (2011).
90. 31 C.F.R. § 1023.320.
91. Regulation Crowdfunding, supra note 2, §§ 227.301, 227.503.
92. See Frequently Asked Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) Questions, FIN. CRIMES ENFORCE-
MENT NETWORK, (last visited Dec. 13, 2013) (quoting Fin. Crimes Enforcement Network, The
SAR Activity Rev. Trends Tips & Issues, at 27 (October 2000)). See generally 31 C.F.R. Subt.
B, Chapter X (lacking any mention of general account termination requirements); OFFICE OF
THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, Money Laundering: A Banker’s Guide to Avoiding
Problems (December 2001) (lacking any mention of general account termination
requirements).
93. FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, supra note 92 (quoting Fin. Crimes En-
forcement Network, The SAR Activity Rev. Trends Tips & Issues, at 27 (October 2000)).
94. Id.
95. 31 C.F.R. § 1023.320(b)(3) (“In situations involving violations that require immedi-
ate attention, such as terrorist financing or ongoing money laundering schemes, the broker-
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Despite the lack of regulatory guidance, funding portals should pre-
pare a reasonable set of criteria under which they will terminate an ex-
isting account.  First, funding portals should consider the strength of
evidence of suspicious activity.  For example, a criminal conviction should
weigh more heavily in favor of account termination than a negative news
article that reports on rumored wrongdoing.  While a funding portal may
file a SAR based on a negative news report, the portal may reasonably
prefer to let the judicial process run its course before terminating the cus-
tomer’s account.
Second, a funding portal should consider the nature of the suspected
activity in light of basic morality, civic duty, and reputational risk.  A fund-
ing portal could be more inclined to terminate the account of a customer
suspected of, for example, large-scale human trafficking or terrorism, than
a customer suspected of small-time drug dealing.
Third, a funding portal should consider its nexus to the suspected activ-
ity, and be more inclined to terminate the account of a customer suspected
of utilizing crowdfunding in furtherance of criminal activity.  For example,
an issuer suspected of trafficking in narcotics under the guise of
crowdfunding (as discussed in the introduction) probably warrants termi-
nation.  On the other hand, a suspected narcotics trafficker who is making
a bona fide investment in a legitimate crowdfunding enterprise probably
does not represent as strong of a case for termination.  Both scenarios
probably represent suspicious activity that should be reported to FinCEN,
but the active use of the funding portal in furtherance of the illicit activity
in the former example weighs more heavily in favor of account
termination.
Funding portals should consider the preceding factors in combination
when making account termination determinations.  It is probably appro-
priate to terminate the account of a suspected arms trafficker who appears
to be using crowdfunding in furtherance his criminal activity, even in the
absence of formal charges.  On the other hand, it may not be necessary to
terminate the account of a customer convicted of tax evasion if there does
not appear to be a nexus between the tax evasion and crowdfunding.
When notifying a customer of account termination, funding portals
should be cognizant of the legal requirement that SARs be kept confiden-
tial and may not be revealed to the customer about whom the SAR was
filed.96  Funding portals should develop a fairly sterile process for notify-
ing customers of account termination without disclosing the existence of a
SAR.  Portals should also be prepared to handle subsequent inquiries (es-
pecially by phone) from customers upset about their account termination.
This requires careful employee training and customer service recordkeep-
dealer shall immediately notify by telephone an appropriate law enforcement authority in
addition to filing timely a SAR-SF.”) (emphasis added).
96. 31 C.F.R. § 1023.320(e)(1)(i) (“No broker-dealer, and no director, officer, em-
ployee, or agent of any broker-dealer, shall disclose a SAR or any information that would
reveal the existence of a SAR.”).
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ing (to avoid disclosing notations on a customer’s account regarding suspi-
cious activity).
Finally, a law enforcement agency may occasionally request that a fi-
nancial institution keep a suspicious account open so as to assist in an
ongoing investigation.97  Financial institutions are not bound to honor this
request; however, it is generally advisable to comply within reason.98  To
the extent practicable, a financial institution should request written docu-
mentation from the law enforcement agency making the request, including
the requested duration and general purpose.99
IV. CONCLUSION
Crowdfunding is an innovative way for emerging growth companies to
obtain necessary financing to expand nascent operations.  Containing costs
on funding portals will be an important aspect of keeping the system as a
whole financially viable.  The suggestions in this Note are designed to
serve as an AML outline for funding portals to achieve regulatory compli-
ance while containing costs.  However, AML is not a static field and fund-
ing portals will need to undertake routine reviews of their risk-based
approach to ensure that the underlying risk assessments remain appropri-
ate.  Finally, it is important to consider that AML programs are effective
as much through deterrence as they are through monitoring and reporting.
By including AML requirements in its proposed regulations, the SEC has
ensured that funding portals will not become an obvious target for poten-
tial money launderers.  The rest is up to funding portals to ensure effec-
tive, efficient AML programs.
97. See Requests by Law Enforcement for Financial Institutions to Maintain Accounts
(FIN-2007-G002), FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK (June 13, 2007), available at http://
www.sec.gov/about/offices/ocie/aml2007/fin-2007-g002.pdf.
98. Id.
99. Id.
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